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Even at a liberal threshold, there was no greater activity for the
alternative action compared to the imitation condition. This
demonstrated no evidence of inhibition. In contrast, there was
much greater brain activity during imitation. Clusters of activity
were identified in rostral anterior cingulate cortex and lateral
orbitofrontal cortex. These findings can be understood in terms
of current models of motor control (e.g., Wolpert et al. 2001).
Imitation is another motor skill which relies on actively develop-
ing motor control in an incremental fashion. The effects of any
action plan being executed are experienced as consequences
for sensory feedback, which serve to modify motor planning
functions (cf. the target article). The role of mirror neurons
within our model (Williams et al. 2007) is to respond to the fide-
lity of the enacted action compared to the perceived action. Error
detection results in conflict-related activity in rostral anterior cin-
gulate and a drive to alter behaviour emanating from lateral orbi-
tofrontal cortex. Imitation is therefore an active process of
comparison between self and other, requiring continuous modi-
fication of action planning with an aim of achieving greater fide-
lity between self and others. Imitation is intentional, operates
within a social context, draws on a capacity for social judgment,
and involves new learning.
One form of pathological “automatic” imitation occurs as
echopraxia, described in people with autism or frontal lobe
lesions (Lhermitte et al. 1986) or those institutionalized with
schizophrenia. Such individuals may have increased sugges-
tibility, and impaired capacity for social judgment and flexible
rule learning. Williams et al. (2004) suggested that echopraxia
in children may reflect delayed rather than deviant learning of
imitation skills, because echopraxia places lower demands on
new learning.
Finally, to return to the central theme of Hurley’s article, what
are the implications of this for the relationship between imitation
and mentalizing? The demands placed by self-other matching on
new learning may also have a bearing on whether mentalizing
processes occur automatically or effortfully. Both imitation and
simulation “theory of mind” depend on comparing perceptions
of another individual’s experience with one’s own. Understand-
ing another individual’s thoughts or actions often requires new
learning and perhaps modifying one’s own point of view. Like
many other skills that are practiced daily, imitation and mind-
reading may appear effortless. The evidence and common experi-
ence suggests that it is quite often otherwise.
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Abstract: After offering a brief account of how we understand
the shared circuits model (SCM), we divide our response into
four sections. First, in section R1, we assess to what extent
SCM is committed to an account of the ontogeny and
phylogeny of shared circuits. In section R2, we examine doubts
raised by several commentators as to whether SCM might be
expanded so as to accommodate the mirroring of emotions,
sensations, and intransitive actions more generally. Section R3
responds to various criticisms that relate to the account of
social-learning Hurley proposes in the target article. We
conclude in section R4 by responding to a number of
commentators who argued for the limitation of control theory
as a framework for studying social cognition.
Introduction: Stirring the science
“Shared circuits” was Susan Hurley’s last grand project.
It set the agenda that might, in another possible world,
have allowed Susan and her commentators to begin to con-
verge on a unified and integrated understanding of some-
thing quite fundamental to human thought and reason: our
ability to know the minds of others, and of ourselves.
Susan’s goal was to show one possible way in which a
shared basic information space for perception and action
might be bootstrapped, function by function, into a grip
on self and other, thus providing the essential entrance
ticket to the rich realm of social cognition. This project
would close the circle, showing that the issues concerning
embodiment and dynamics (Hurley 1998) were never that
far away from those concerning social cognition, policy,
and the possibility of responsibility (Hurley 1989; 2003;
2006a).
Susan died before she could see this project into print.
But had she been able to do so, she would have been truly
delighted by the wide array of thoughtful, challenging, and
constructive commentaries that her shared circuits model
(SCM) has elicited. One special source of delight would
have been the sheer interdisciplinary diversity of the
responses. For Susan believed very strongly that a
proper understanding of minds, persons, and reasons
would emerge only from tough, cooperative, interdisci-
plinary work drawing on psychology, philosophy, neuro-
science, social science, and cognitive science. One
measure of the success of SCM is thus its capacity to stir
that larger scientific pot. In that, the treatment (as we
see) succeeds wonderfully. Moreover, there seems to be
significant agreement concerning many of the finer
details of the story. In our response, we try to do three
things: First, we briefly clarify the nature of the story on
offer; second, we highlight (and where possible respond
to) the main critical issues raised by the commentators;
and third, we showcase the exciting range of new sugges-
tions (and additional mechanisms) that the commentary
phase has uncovered. In suggesting the responses that
follow, we are acutely aware of our own shortcomings as
surrogate respondents. Some of the issues raised simply
exceeded our grasp of the subject area, the target material,
or both. Where this has arisen, we have simply remained
silent, and beg the readers’ (and the commentators’)
forbearance.
R1. The nature of the beast
One of the challenges facing an embodied and situated
approach to cognitive science is to map out a path that
might have taken humans from the basic kinds of
capacities for on-line adaptive response we share with
robots and nonhuman animals to distinctively human cog-
nitive abilities, such as the capacity for rational delibera-
tion and the ability to make sense of the purposeful
behaviour of other agents. The shared circuits model
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(SCM) contributes to meeting this challenge. It describes
a set of mechanisms that might have taken humans and
their evolutionary ancestors from active perception to imi-
tation, mindreading, and deliberative, strategic thinking.
Each of the model’s five layers is given a functional
description, which deliberately abstracts away from
details of neural implementation. This is not to say that
the model is silent about implementation issues – it pre-
dicts a common coding for perception and action
implemented by the mirror system, for instance (see
sect. 2.2 of the target article). However, it leaves the
details of how each layer might be neurally implemented
as open questions for further investigation. At least one
commentator (Preston) took the lack of detail at the
neuroanatomical/functional level to be a weakness of the
model. Notice, however, that any explanation of how the
layers of the model are implemented in the brain will
itself most likely be a functional explanation. Preston con-
cedes as much in referring to a neuroanatomical/
functional level of description. Consider, for instance, a
putative explanation of how layer 3 could be implemented
in the mirror system. Such an explanation will identify a
widely distributed neural system that includes amongst
other regions the temporal lobe, the rostral inferior parie-
tal lobule, and the ventral premotor cortex. In virtue of
what do these separate neural regions form parts of a
single neural system that implements a mirror system?
Arguably, disparate neural regions form a part of a single
distributed system because of what they do – because
the cells at these regions have activation profiles that
make a contribution to realising a particular task. It is
true that SCM doesn’t tell us which parts of the brain
coalesce to form the different layers of the model, but it
does purport to describe what sub-tasks these parts of
the brain must perform if they are to contribute to realis-
ing a capacity for action understanding.
In this spirit, we propose interpreting SCM as having
two objectives. First, it offers a task-level description of
action understanding. Second, it identifies possible mech-
anisms that could do the work of accomplishing each of
these tasks. Action understanding is a multi-faceted
capacity, including the abilities to learn novel behaviours
by copying, to predict and explain other’s behaviour, and
to think strategically about one’s social interactions.
Hurley decomposes each of these complex capacities
into more basic sub-tasks. The different layers of SCM
describe possible mechanisms that could perform these
sub-tasks.
Consider SCM’s layer 3 as an example. Layer 3 ident-
ifies a mechanism for mirroring – the kind of behavioural
priming that occurs in us when we observe an action per-
formed by another person. Our observing the other’s
action makes us more likely to perform an action of the
same type, ourselves. Hurley argues that our capacity for
action understanding is facilitated by this tendency to
copy behaviours. As the behaviours we can copy become
more complex, so also does the repertoire of actions we
can potentially understand. Copying behaviour is there-
fore a sub-task one has to be capable of performing if
one is to get into the business of understanding the goal-
directed behaviour of others.
Now consider the mechanism SCM introduces to
explain an animal’s ability to copy behaviour. The mechan-
ism is not new to layer 3 but has already been introduced
at the previous layer to explain amongst other things the
motor system’s execution of fast, fluent sensorimotor beha-
viours. Thus, an explanation is being given of one aspect of
action understanding in terms of the same mechanisms
used to control sensorimotor behaviour. Often, sensorimo-
tor behaviour will require sensory feedback to be made
available faster than the sensory systems can supply.
A way around this problem would be for the motor
system to employ its learned associations between motor
outputs and the sensory consequences of those outputs
to make predictions about what will happen when a
given motor command is executed. In control theory,
these predictive models are called forward models.
At layer 3, forward models are run in reverse, so that a
system can, instead of predicting the sensory consequence
of an action, work out from an observed action the motor
commands that were the cause of this action. Running a
forward model in reverse thus produces a motor
command. Whether the system then carries out this
motor command is a further question. Most of the time,
the execution of motor commands arrived at exogenously
from observing the actions of others will be inhibited.
This makes good evolutionary sense, as Makino (and
indeed Hurley) notes: A creature that copied the beha-
viour of an approaching predator would not be long of
this world.
How does this mechanism of running forward models in
reverse explain an animal’s ability to copy behaviour?
When a forward model is run in reverse, the outcome of
this process will be the production of a motor command.
This explains why, when we observe another acting, we
are automatically primed to perform the same or similar
action ourselves. We have this standing disposition
because running a forward model backwards produces in
us the same motor plan that initiated the action in the
other person.
We can also see now what Hurley means when she
claims that a shared information space for perception
and action can also function as a shared information
space for self and other. Perception and action share a
common information space in part because perceiving
another agent acting causes our motor system to
produce the same or similar motor commands that were
the causes of that agent’s actions. This information space
can also be deployed in action understanding. Say I per-
ceive another person reach for and answer their mobile
phone. My motor system will now run a forward model
in reverse and produce the same or similar motor plan
that led the other person to reach and pick up their
ringing handset. This motor plan is now available to be
used by other subpersonal systems (layer 4 of SCM) to
make sense of the other person’s action and its causes.
However, the information my motor system makes
available doesn’t distinguish between motor plans that
are my own and have been initiated endogenously, and
the motor plans of another person that have been
initiated in me exogenously. In this sense, the information
space that perception and action share is also an infor-
mation space that self and other share. This sharing of
information makes possible a kind of direct, non-inferen-
tial understanding of the action of others. There is no dif-
ficulty at this level of processing about how we acquire
access to information about the causes of another
person’s actions. At this level of processing, the
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information that is used to make sense of the actions of
others is intersubjective – it doesn’t distinguish between
self and other.
So far, we have proposed a way of thinking about each of
SCM’s layers, but of course a good deal of the model’s
explanatory work is accomplished by exploring possible
interactions between the layers. We have already seen
something of how one layer can borrow mechanisms
from an earlier layer and exapt this mechanism for a new
function. Hurley also describes some ways in which
layers might function together to achieve complex tasks
that each layer cannot accomplish on its own. Thus, the
forward models of layer 2 can be combined with a mech-
anism for monitored output inhibition introduced at layer
4 with the result that a system can begin to model possible
courses of action and assess the consequences of these
actions in advance of executing them. A system with
layers 2 and 4 can begin to engage in trial-and-error learn-
ing “in the head.” By combining the mirroring functions
made possible by layer 3 with the monitored output inhi-
bition of layer 4, we get a system that can distinguish
actions that are its own from actions that belong to
another. One difference between motor plans that are
endogenously produced and those that are exogenously
produced by observing the action of another is that the
latter tend to be inhibited. By monitoring inhibited
output, a system could thus acquire information that
could be used to distinguish its own endogenously
produced motor plans from motor plans it finds itself
with as a consequence of layer 3. Moreover, such a
system could use the information made available by
layer 3 to begin to make sense of the other’s behaviour.
Depending on the systems own repertoire of behaviour
and the associations between means and ends that fuel
its forward models, a system combining layers 3 and 4
could use its learned associations to understand the
means/end structure of the other’s behaviour. Layer 5
introduces a capacity for the monitored simulation of
inputs. This can be combined with layers 3 and 4 to gen-
erate information about the possible actions of others
and the causes and effects of such possible actions.
A system with this combination of layers can begin to
engage in strategic thinking and game-theoretic delibera-
tion about the action of others. (For more details on the
role of mindreading in strategic social intelligence, see
Hurley 2005a.)
R2. Linking layers
Many of Hurley’s commentators raised questions that bear
on the interaction among layers we have sketched, and it is
to these questions that we now turn. Chakrabarti
& Baron-Cohen’s commentary raises some challenging
questions about the developmental progression between
layers. Oberman & Ramachandran also wonder how
shared circuits might develop, but they raise questions
about both the ontogeny and the phylogeny of shared cir-
cuits. Are shared circuits hard-wired, learned, or a combi-
nation of both?
Hurley states that she doesn’t take SCM to imply a
single account of the development of capacities for imita-
tion, mindreading, and deliberative thinking. The number-
ing of the layers, she writes, “does not necessarily
represent the order of evolution or development” (sect.
4, para. 9). Rather, the model is intended to provoke
hypotheses that map the layers onto “specific phylogenetic
or ontogenetic progressions” (sect. 4, para. 9). In other
words, Hurley is not committed to a particular answer
about how the different layers might feed into a story
about the development of mindreading capacities.
Nor does she take a firm stand on the question of
whether a capacity for imitative learning is culturally
acquired or forms a part of our innate inheritance.
Hurley believed that questions of this kind would be
settled through close collaboration between science and
philosophy. Hence, she would have very much welcomed
Oberman & Ramachandran’s constructive suggestions
about possible experiments that might answer the
nature/nurture question as it arises for mirroring.
This is not to say that Hurley had nothing to say either in
her target article or elsewhere about these questions.
Indeed, she makes a concrete proposal about how mirror-
ing might have arisen. She begins by telling a Hebb-
inspired story about how cells might come to fire both
for others’ actions that are observed and for actions of
one’s own that are executed. (The story doesn’t originate
with Hurley, but can also be found in Goldman [2006,
Ch. 6] Heyes [2002; 2005], and Keysers & Perrett
[2004]) Suppose the action is one of grasping. Superior
temporal sulcus (STS) neurons that respond to obser-
vations of grasping behaviour might overlap in time with
activity in areas (e.g., PF and F5) that are involved in initi-
ating the grasping behaviour. As a result of Hebbian learn-
ing, the connections between STS and the motor areas will
be reinforced. The effect of this reinforcement will be that
cells in motor areas will fire both when the agent observes
his own movements and when he observes the movements
of others. Clearly, this sort of account is going to work only
for movements that the agent can see himself performing.
In order to account for the copying of facial expressions –
we can assume that an agent will often be able to copy
many facial expression without being able to see his own
face – Hurley introduces a number of different factors.
She concedes that there could be a role for innate supra-
modal correspondence between observed acts and an
observer’s similar acts, of the kind suggested by Meltzoff
and Moore’s (1997) active intermodal mapping (AIM)
hypothesis. Hurley also considers a number of other poss-
ible explanations for mirroring when one cannot observe
one’s own behaviour, including one in terms of stimulus
enhancement (sect. 3.3, para. 7, 8). We won’t repeat the
hypothesis. Suffice it to say that Hurley saw a role both
for learning and for innate capacities in explaining the
emergence of mirroring.
Could a creature understand the action of others but
lack a capacity for mirroring? Conversely, could a creature
have an unimpaired capacity for mirroring but be incap-
able of making sense of the behaviour of others? Answer-
ing these questions promises to have ramifications for how
we think about the relation between mirroring and layers 4
and 5 that do the work of explaining mindreading.
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen suggest that psychopaths
may have intact mindreading abilities but deficits in affec-
tive empathy. Affective empathy is arguably explained by
the mirroring capacities introduced at layer 3, more on
which in a moment. Thus, psychopaths may present a
case in which we have intact layers 4 and 5 but a
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compromised layer 3. Subjects with autism spectrum dis-
orders (ASDs), on the other hand, exhibit impairments
in mindreading and affective empathy. Perhaps they
provide an example of what can go wrong when layers 3,
4, and 5 are compromised. Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen
present these two cases as an example of double dis-
sociation of mindreading and affective empathy capacities.
However, subjects with ASDs do not display the opposite
profile to that of psychopaths: they do not have intact
capacities for affective empathy but impaired mindreading
skills. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), for instance,
found that subjects with Asperger Syndrome scored sig-
nificantly lower than normals in a questionnaire testing
for empathic skills. Psychopathy certainly establishes the
possibility of mindreading without affective empathy, but
ASD does not, as far as we can see, establish the possibility
of affective empathy without mindreading. This casts
doubt on the suggestions that we here confront a clear
double dissociation. But leaving this issue to one side,
we want to focus on Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen’s inter-
esting claim that this body of evidence challenges the
claim that layers 3 and 4 are required for layer 5.
The first response we would make in Hurley’s defence is
that SCM makes no hypotheses about the development of
mindreading abilities, and in particular it does not expli-
citly claim that layers 3 and 4 are necessary for the emer-
gence of mindreading abilities at layer 5. We have just seen
how Hurley left as an open question how the layers of
SCM relate to the development and acquisition of mind-
reading abilities. Nevertheless, it is true that Hurley does
offer an explanation as to how a capacity for mindreading
might get started, and perhaps it is this story that
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen mean to dispute. We will
first consider whether the explanation Hurley offers
commits her to the claim that layers 3 and 4 are required
for mindreading abilities. Second, we will assess whether
the latter hypothesis is really challenged by the disorders
discussed by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen.
Is Hurley committed to the claim that layers 3 and 4 are
necessary if a person is to acquire the sorts of mindreading
skills made possible by layer 5? We have already explained
how Hurley took mindreading to begin at layer 4. Prior to
layer 4, the information a creature has available for making
sense of the behaviour of others does not distinguish
between self and other. This information can be used to
(implicitly) recognise and identify agents that behave in
ways similar to me. This recognition of the fundamental
similarity between self and other forms the basis for
empathy. However, mindreading – the interpretation
and prediction of other’s actions – begins with the acqui-
sition of a grasp of the self/other distinction. Once this dis-
tinction is understood, a creature can begin to attribute
mental states to the other – to interpret or “read” the
other’s mind. According to SCM, one acquires an ability
to distinguish self and other by acquiring a mechanism
for monitoring the inhibition of mirroring. The monitoring
of inhibited mirroring allows a creature to identify motor
plans that are not its own. With this understanding in
place, the creature can begin to populate the world with
other perspectives and decentre from its own situation in
the here and now to entertain other possible points of
view. This capacity becomes more powerful in creatures
that possess the representational capacities introduced at
layer 5, and can model not just possible courses of action
but can in addition model possible mappings from
sensory input to motor output. At first glance, then, it
would seem correct to attribute to Hurley the hypothesis
that layers 3 and 4 are required for layer 5. Layer 4
looks to be required for layer 5 since the former supplies
models of the outputs, which are used at layer 5 in the
simulations of complete mappings from inputs to
outputs. Layer 3 seems to be required by layer 4 since it
makes available the bi-directional simulations that are
taken off-line at layer 4. Thus, we might conclude on
these grounds that Hurley is indeed committed to the
hypothesis attacked by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen.
Although there are strong grounds for attributing this
hypothesis to Hurley, it doesn’t seem to us to be strictly
entailed by SCM. SCM suggests an explanation of how
an animal might come to be able to distinguish itself
from others. If we accept the idea that mirroring provides
information that does not differentiate self from other,
some such explanation is required. However, the cases
discussed by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen involve indi-
viduals whose capacity for mirroring is impaired. Such
individuals will not need layer 4 to distinguish themselves
from others, since they do not have information at their
disposal for which the self/other distinction fails. They
precisely do not identify with others empathically, nor
do they recognise themselves to be similar to others.
Although they do not need layer 4 to distinguish them-
selves from others, layer 4 could nevertheless continue
to work in conjunction with layer 2 to provide information
about alternative possible courses of action. Layer 4 could
continue to supply simulations of possible actions to layer
5. Therefore, it doesn’t seem out of the question that a
system could exhibit the sort of mindreading abilities
made possible by layers 4 and 5 despite having an impaired
layer 3.
Suppose we nevertheless concede that a fully intact
layer 3 is required for layers 4 and 5. Could an individual
with an impaired layer 3 nevertheless exhibit intact mind-
reading abilities? Possibly. Hurley concedes that even a
creature equipped with the sorts of sophisticated rep-
resentational capacities ushered in by layer 5 might not
have what it takes for full-fledged mature mindreading.
Mature mindreaders can track many different agents,
identifying them in a wide range of different situations.
Hurley suggests that language might well be required for
an “understanding of multiple others with multiple
alternatives and varying beliefs” (sect. 3.5, para. 2).
Suppose a person could acquire mastery of a language
without the use of layer 3 (a possibility challenged by the
claim that imitation is required for the acquisition of
language; but for a defence of this hypothesis, see, e.g.,
Arbib & Rizzolatti 1997; Iacoboni 2005). It would then
be possible for such a person to exhibit high-level mind-
reading skills despite lacking a capacity for mirroring.
Perhaps such an individual could acquire a theory of
mind by learning generalisations relating behaviour, the
environment, and mental states in much the same way as
scientists generate theories based on observations (for an
account of mindreading abilities along these lines, see,
e.g., Gopnik & Wellman 1992; 1994). Gallagher (2005)
suggests that a high-functioning autistic like Temple-
Grandin might deploy exactly this type of theorising strat-
egy to understand the intentions and emotions of others.
Gallagher writes of Temple-Grandin that she “reads
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about people, and observes them, in an attempt to arrive at
the various principles that would explain and predict their
actions in what she describes as ‘a strictly logical process’”
(Gallagher 2005, p. 236). We can imagine a psychopath
acquiring mindreading abilities in much the same way.
We conclude, then, that even if we were to suppose that
SCM entails the hypothesis that layer 3 is required for
layers 4 and 5 (something we are inclined to dispute),
SCM can still handle the case of psychopathy.
What about subjects with ASD? These subjects have dif-
ficulties taking up perspectives that are not their own, and
there is some evidence that this leads to difficulties in imitat-
ing (for a balanced assessment of this evidence, seeGoldman
2005). Hobson and Lee (1999), for instance, showed that
autistic subjects failed to copy behaviours that required per-
spective switching. In one task, the experimenter took a
wooden pipe rack in his left hand and held it against the
upper part of his left shoulder. With his right hand, the
experimenter took a wooden stick and strummed across
the ridges and slots of the pipe rack three times, making a
staccato sound. Of the 16 autistic subjects, 15 ran the stick
over the pipe rack, but only 2 of the 16 held the pipe rack
against their shoulder as the experimenter had demon-
strated. In order to copy the action, the autistic subjects
had to perform the same action in relation to a different
body, their own. First, they had to recognise the relation
between the action and the experimenter’s body. This
required them to switch from their own perspective to
adopt that of the experimenter. Having recognised the
relation of the action to the experimenter’s body, they then
had to switch back and re-enact this relation from their
own perspective. SCM would predict that subjects with
impaired mirroring and mindreading abilities would find
this sort of perspective switching difficult. Subjects with
impaired mirroring abilities will not identify with and recog-
nise others as similar to themselves. Furthermore, when
layers 4 and 5 are damaged, subjects will find it difficult to
detach from their own perspective. This is exactly what we
find in autistic subjects. We conclude that the deficits we
find in subjects with ASDmay also be consistent with SCM.
Hurley tells us that the non-negotiable parts of the
model concern (1) the explanation of mirroring as “an
exaptive reversal of online prediction” and (2) “the way
the actual/possible and self/other distinctions arise as
online processes are overlain by monitored inhibition”
(sect. 4, para. 9). We consider next the commentaries
that challenge each of these claims beginning with the
first of SCM’s non-negotiable claims. Whereas the set of
issues we have just considered relate to the interaction
between layers, the commentaries to which we now turn
question the use that is made of forward models and
sensory feedback introduced at layers 1 and 2 to explain
the capacities for mindreading that come on the scene
with layers 3 to 5.
Goldman worries about the attempt to explain the mir-
roring of emotion, pain, and other sensations by appeal to
lower-level mechanisms of adaptive feedback control and
forward models introduced at layers 1 and 2. He chal-
lenges a core claim of SCM that there are systematic
relationships between the mechanisms used in the
control of sensorimotor behaviour and those that underpin
our mindreading abilities. Similar concerns are voiced in
the commentaries of Heyes, Preston, and Chakrabarti
& Baron-Cohen. Heyes argues that the account of
mirroring at layer 3 may not be readily applied to intransi-
tive actions like facial expressions and gesture. Yet she
points out that much of the evidence for the mirror
system in humans comes from the copying of intransitive
actions, rather than the instrumental actions modelled by
SCM. Preston claims that there are no good reasons
from either phylogeny or ontogeny to claim that control
mechanisms like those found at layers 1 and 2 precede
the mirroring mechanisms of layer 3. Again the worry
seems to be that the appeal to control theory is inadequate
when it comes to explaining the sort of mindreading
involved in understanding others’ emotional experiences.
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen wonder how SCM applies
to the processing of facial expression. They suggest that
the perception of emotions could recruit layers 4 and 5
to different extents, and that SCM makes no provision
for such a possibility. Preston can be understood as
raising a related concern when she cites evidence in
support of the claim that the perception of emotional
facial expressions activates semantic-level representations
for specific emotions.
We suggest two lines of response. First, it should be
recognised that Hurley never claimed to have identified
a set of mechanisms that can account for every aspect of
social cognition. SCM as it is described in the target
article is offered as an account of the understanding of
instrumental actions – actions that have a means-end
structure. Hurley claims that mechanisms from control
theory can explain this particular type of social cognition.
She claims that there is a systematic relationship
between the control and mirroring of instrumental
actions. If it should turn out that there is no such systema-
tic relationship between control and the mirroring of
intransitive or expressive actions, this would not harm
SCM, which claims only that such a relationship holds
for the case of instrumental actions. It is certainly an inter-
esting question as to whether SCM might be extended to
account not just for our understanding of instrumental
actions, but also for what Hurley calls “expressive
actions.” Indeed, this is one of the questions Hurley
raises in section 4.1.2, and we shall consider this possibility
in more detail shortly. It is surely worthwhile to ask how
many of our higher cognitive capacities can be explained
by appeal to the same basic mechanisms we employ in sen-
sorimotor behaviour. Natural selection often works by
taking mechanisms that already exist and tinkering with
them. It therefore makes good evolutionary sense
to suppose that the very same mechanisms that are used
to control sensorimotor behaviour might also serve a
very different function in making possible mindreading
and social intelligence more generally.
Goldman, Heyes, and Preston suggest, however, that
a different set of mechanisms might be required to explain
emotional mirroring from those described at layer 3. Con-
sider the following example of emotional mirroring.
I watch a couple arguing and I perceive the woman’s
fear at her partner’s anger: I see the fear written on her
face. When I see her fear, the same parts of my brain
are active as when I myself feel fear. Williams et al.
(2001), showed subjects Ekman faces expressing fear,
and found that when fearful faces produced increases in
skin conductance this response was also accompanied by
increased activity in the amygdala. (Ekman faces are
photographs of expressive faces used in emotion
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recognition experiments.) Adolphs et al. (1994) found that
patients with amygdala damage were poor at recognising
fear in photographs depicting facial expressions. As in
the case of mirroring of instrumental actions, seeing a
facial expression of emotion primes us to feel the
emotion ourselves. It would seem, however, that SCM’s
layer 3 cannot explain this type of mirroring. There
doesn’t seem to be anything analogous to a forward
model that could, in the case of emotion mirroring, be
run in reverse. When we feel fear, this feeling manifests
itself in some change in facial musculature. However,
the change in facial musculature we undergo is not a
means to achieving any end. We don’t intend anything in
this case, nor do we act in order to bring about what we
intend. Expressive actions like the facial expression of
emotions do not have a means-end structure, which is
just to say that they are not instrumental actions.
By way of a second response, we want to briefly consider
whether an account of emotional mirroring could be given
which builds on the sorts of control mechanisms Hurley
appeals to explain the mirroring of instrumental actions.
In an unpublished review of Goldman’s (2006) Simulating
Minds, Hurley writes that to understand how control and
mirroring are related outside the context of instrumental
actions and intention reading, an account must be given
of “how instrumental and expressive actions are related.”
She continues, “In my view, mirroring for expressive
action builds on the more fundamental, control-related
mirroring for instrumental action” (Hurley 2007, p. 11).
She doesn’t expand on this comment, but we will try to
fill out what shemight have had inmind, first by contrasting
her view of how simulations are involved in mirroring with
that of Goldman. On the basis of this contrast one of us
(Kiverstein) has developed a somewhat speculative sugges-
tion about how Hurley might have thought about shared
circuits as they arise in the context of emotional mirroring.
Along the way, we will also have some things to say about
how instrumental and expressive actions might be related.
Goldman and Sripada (2005) describe four accounts of
emotional mirroring, and plump for what they call the
unmediated resonance model (also see Goldman (2006,
Ch. 6). According to this model, when we see a person’s
facial expression of emotion, this directly causes in us
a similar emotional state: “observation of the target’s
face ‘directly’ without any mediation . . . triggers (sub-
threshold) activation of the same neural substrate associ-
ated with the emotion in question” (Goldman & Sripada
2005, p. 207). We come to share the emotion that the
other person displays because our observing this display
causes in us an emotional experience of the same type.
We can recognise the other’s emotion on this model
because we come to occupy a state that resembles that
of the target. Goldman and Sripada are proposing here a
simulation-based account of mindreading for the emotions
according to which we simulate the other person’s
emotional state by instantiating a process which, when it
functions properly, results in a state that resembles or
matches the target’s mental state. Simulation is explained
here in terms of the products (mental states and their con-
tents) of a mental process of simulation. If this is correct, it
is by first producing in ourselves a mental state that
matches or resembles the mental state of the target we
are seeking to understand that we become able to work
out which mental state to attribute to the other.
Hurley suggests in her author meets critics review of
Goldman’s book (2007), however, that there is a
process/product ambiguity in Goldman’s account of simu-
lation. One of the lines of evidence Goldman appeals to in
support of his account of emotion experience is the finding
that the same brain areas are active during the experience
of, and the recognition of, emotions. When these areas are
damaged, not only do subjects lack a capacity for a certain
type of emotion, but they also have difficulties in recognis-
ing this emotion on the basis of facial expressions. This evi-
dence suggests a similarity in the neural/functional
processes that subserve emotion experience and emotion
recognition within an individual. Goldman’s account of
emotional mirroring takes this similarity in processes to
be grounds for inferring a similarity in emotion experience
between observer and target. It is this similarity or resem-
blance that forms the basis for the observer’s attribution of
an emotion of a particular type to the target. Hurley argues
that interpersonal similarity of mental state of the kind
Goldman appeals to in his explanation of emotional
mirroring is not sufficient for simulation. Interpersonal
similarity of states does not count as simulation unless
an individual reuses his own mental processes to
drive his mindreading. Thus, Hurley proposes what she
calls the re-use conception of simulation, according to
which we come to recognise and understand what the
other is feeling by using the processes that take place in
us when we undergo an emotion episode of the same
type. It is our re-using this same process that explains
how we come to understand what the other is
experiencing.
Suppose we accept that similarity of emotional state
between observer and target is insufficient for mirroring,
but that in addition what is required for true simulation
is that the observer’s emotion recognition process must
use her own emotion experiencing processes for the
purpose of simulating the other. Now compare the case
of emotion mirroring with mirroring of instrumental
actions. The mirroring of instrumental actions is the
result of learned associations between movement and
the sensory consequences of movement. There will also
be learned associations in the case of emotion expression.
The changes in facial musculature, for instance, will have
sensory consequences. If Adolphs et al. (2000) are right,
there will also be somatosensory changes sometimes
throughout the body that are associated with a given
emotion. So just as in the case of instrumental actions,
there will be associations between the execution of an
expressive action and reafferent feedback.
There is, however, an important difference in the case of
expressive actions that we should mention. In the case of
instrumental actions, associations get set up between
motor plans and visual experiences of one’s own move-
ment, so that when an observer sees similar movements
performed by others the same motor plan is evoked.
(See the Hebbian account of mirroring sketched earlier
and in the target article [sect. 3.3, para. 5].) However,
the reafferent feedback that is available in the case of
emotion expression won’t include visual feedback: We
cannot see our own faces when we express an emotion
(except when we use a mirror), nor do we see any of the
other bodily changes that accompany an emotion experi-
ence. Thus, it would seem we run into the correspondence
problem in attempting to explain emotion mirroring. The
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correspondence problem is of course a quite general
problem for explanations of imitation, and one for which
various answers have been proposed. One approach
invokes general purpose learning mechanisms (see Brass
& Heyes 2005). Another introduces innate special
purpose mechanisms (see Meltzoff 2002b). We have
already seen how SCM suggests that the correspondence
problem may be solved by a variety of different mechan-
isms, but here is not the place to suggest how SCM
might tackle this problem as it arises for the case of
emotions. We flag this as a problem to be solved in
future work that develops an account of shared circuits
for emotional expression.
We now have the ingredients in place to sketch a poss-
ible way in which an account of emotional mirroring
might build on the connection between mirroring and
control that SCM describes. We come to recognise the
other’s emotion experience by re-using our own emotion-
experiencing processes. In the instrumental action case,
the processes for identifying the intentions that are the
causes of an observed behaviour are the same processes
we use to act ourselves. The same is true in the emotion
case: The processes for recognising emotion are the same
as (or better, they overlap considerably with) the processes
that cause the expression of an emotion. Are the processes
that cause the expression of an emotion the same as the
processes that cause intentional action? There may be
some crossover, but there will also be important differ-
ences. As Goldman, Heyes, and Preston note, there is
nothing like a forward model and visual feedback in the
case of emotional expression. This is why we cannot
simply take layer 3 and apply it to the case of emotion
mirroring. Let us, however, ignore these differences for
the moment and focus on some broad similarities.
Our own emotion-experiencing processes will include
motor processes that cause certain facial expressions and
the sensory consequences of these motor processes. The
actions that constitute the expression of an emotion will
be associated with these various kinds of sensory conse-
quence. Hurley argues that perceptual experience (see
Hurley 1998) is the result of tracking relationships
between sensory flows of information and motor beha-
viour (O’Regan & Noe¨ [2001a] propose a similar view).
A similar model would seem to be applicable to emotional
expression. To experience emotion, on this model, is to
track certain invariant relationships between an action
that expresses the emotion (e.g., a facial expression) and
the sensory consequences of this action. This tracking
ability forms a part of SCM at layer 2. We can keep
track of changes in flows of sensory information because
we have learned to associate movements with certain
sensory consequences. It is these associations that form
the basis for the forward models introduced at layer 2
and that are re-used at layer 3. Our suggestion is that
Hurley’s account of perceptual experience might be
extended to emotion experience so that, when we
undergo an emotion episode, what this involves is our
tracking the relationships between an action that is the
expression of this emotion and the sensory consequences
of this action. When we come to recognise the other’s
emotion, we do so by using the very same tracking abilities.
We come to recognise the other’s emotion by re-using the
same processes that form the basis for our own experi-
ences of emotion. We take this to be one way in which
emotional mirroring might re-use mechanisms introduced
at layers 1 and 2 to account for emotion experience.
Hence, we tentatively conclude that emotion experience
doesn’t present an insurmountable problem for SCM.
Rather, it presents an opportunity for the future develop-
ment of the model.
Preston reports a behavioural study (Preston & Stans-
field, in press) she interprets as challenging the sort of
account of emotion experience we have just sketched.
The findings of the study were that perception of an
emotional expression not only results in mirroring but
also, as Preston writes, “rapidly activates the semantic-
level representation for the specific emotion.” Presumably,
by “semantic-level” representation, she means that sub-
jects can identify and recognise the emotion. However,
on the simulation-based account of mirroring, this is pre-
dicted. The idea is that we use the same processes to
recognise emotions that we use to experience emotions.
We turn now to Hurley’s account of how the self/other
and actual/possible distinctions arise out of monitored
inhibition, which Hurley describes as the second non-
negotiable feature of SCM. Preston claims that it might
not be monitoring of inhibited output that generates an
understanding of the distinction between self and other,
and suggests that there are many other mechanisms that
might do this work. She does not, however, say exactly
what she has in mind. Furey & Keenan pursue a
similar worry and ask whether an account might be
given of an understanding of the self/other distinction in
terms of forward models and the work they do in dis-
tinguishing self-caused actions from externally generated
actions. Furey & Keenan discuss the case of auditory
verbal hallucination when subjects claim to hear voices
in their heads. They suggest that the misattribution in
this case might be explained by a malfunctioning
forward model which doesn’t perform its normal function
of enabling the subject to distinguish self-generated inner
speech from externally generated speech. We find this
suggestion very plausible. Furthermore, Furey &
Keenan’s idea of applying forward models and efference
copy to the case of inner speech resonates well with
Garrod & Pickering’s compelling account of the role of
forward models in interactive dialogue. However, we
take this suggestion to show that forward models can
help explain how a subject might acquire an understand-
ing of the difference between self and world. Part of this
understanding will include an ability to distinguish his
own actions from externally caused events, and efference
copy will no doubt have an important role to play in
such an explanation (see, e.g., Blakemore et al. 1999).
Notice, however, that this is not the same problem that
the monitoring of inhibited output was introduced to
solve. At layer 3, we have a single process that is involved
both in the execution of an action by the self and in the
observation of actions performed by others. The infor-
mation space for perception and action is therefore
a shared information space for self and other. Given this,
the problem is then to explain how a creature using infor-
mation that doesn’t distinguish between self and other
could acquire a grasp of such a distinction. The resources
Furey & Keenan describe might yield an understanding of
the difference between self and world and enable normal
subjects to solve the sorts of attribution problems these
commentators describe. However, it is not clear that
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these resources could help a mirroring system to differen-
tiate information that relates to the self from information
relating to others.
Northoff, meanwhile, asks some hard questions regard-
ing the exact form of the neural coding implicated by
Hurley, and suggests that the coding needs to capture
the relations between different stimuli and between
stimuli and motor actions. It seems to us that Hurley
would agree, and that relational coding (insofar as we
understand this notion) is indeed apt for many of the pur-
poses of the SCM. Whether Hurley’s story further
demands, as Northoff suggests, a radically new conception
of the self so as to reflect these relational elements, is a
matter we cannot resolve definitively. But elsewhere
Hurley speaks intriguingly of the self as a “dynamic singu-
larity” itself created out of a system of relations (see Hurley
1998, pp. 206–207).
Makino argues that the self/other distinction arises not
when the motor system monitors its inhibited outputs but
instead from a monitoring of failed actions. He raises some
interesting and important questions about how the motor
system works out which outputs to inhibit, and he suggests
as an answer that the motor system will tend to inhibit
output in cases when it is operating only with partial infor-
mation. This may be one way of making this sort of decision,
but it doesn’t seemobvious to us that all inhibited actions are
ones that would fail were they to be performed. Further-
more, it wasn’t entirely clear to us how to understand the
suggestion of monitoring failed actions. If this consists in
monitoring actions that the system fails to perform, then it
strikes us that this is just another way of talking about moni-
toring of inhibited input. We understand inhibition as the
default principle that the motor system operates on,
because inhibiting actions that the system has a tendency
to copy is adaptive. This default is overridden in some
cases, and the decision as to when this happens will be in
the hands of executive systems in the brain. We will return
to a related issue shortly in our discussion of the commen-
taries by Behrendt andWilliams.
Hove provides some nice examples of what he calls
“interpersonal synchrony” in which monitoring of inhib-
ited output might fail to generate an understanding of
the difference between self and other. In the sorts of
cases he has in mind, our actions are synchronised with
those of another person. Hove asks how we distinguish
our own actions from those of the other in these sorts of
cases. There is no motor output inhibition in the cases
Hove describes, so it doesn’t look like we can appeal to
this mechanism to solve the problem. Hove certainly
raises an interesting problem here, but it seems to us
that the sorts of cases his puzzle arises for are not the
ones layer 4 is introduced to explain. His examples of inter-
personal synchrony do not involve the copying of beha-
viour, so they do not meet Hurley’s definition of
mirroring, where mirroring is the process that occurs
when observing a behaviour primes the observer to
perform the same behaviour himself. We turn next to
questions relating to imitation.
R3. Imitation and mirroring
Williams and Behrendt both discuss the question of
whether mirroring is an automatic process, but arrive at
opposite answers. Behrendt asks how predictive simu-
lation, which he takes to require consciousness, can be
related to mirroring that happens automatically. It is not
clear why Behrendt thinks predictive simulation must be
conscious. Hurley takes layer 2 of her model, which is
the layer at which predictive simulation occurs, to describe
a subpersonal mechanism. Forward models do produce
simulations that may often involve motor imagery;
however, this imagery is not always conscious. Behrendt
notes how movement plans can be formed automatically
upon perception of a salient event. When this event is an
observed action, we have just the sort of mirroring that
layer 3 is introduced to explain. Behrendt points out that
traits and stereotypes can automatically elicit patterns of
behaviour, but again it is just this sort of case that SCM’s
layer 3 was introduced to explain. Behrendt also points
out that our motivation for copying in these cases may
often be social approval. Nielsen provides some exper-
imental results that support this idea. He suggests that
2-year-old infants will commonly be motivated to copy
behaviour because they want to share an experience with
the other, and he describes experiments in which 2-year-
olds were less inclined to imitate when not engaged in
social interaction. We think Hurley would have found
these results extremely interesting, but that claims about
what motivates us to imitate lie somewhat out of the
purview of SCM. It is an important and interesting ques-
tion as to just why we have a tendency to imitate, and it
is a striking finding that this tendency changes as we
develop. SCM, however, seeks to show that there is a sys-
tematic relationship between the control mechanisms we
use in sensorimotor behaviour and the understanding of
instrumental actions. It is a further question as to what
reasons we have for imitating when we do so.
Williams attributes to Hurley the claim that imitation is
automatic. He goes on to make a compelling case for the
view that imitation is an “intentional,” “effortful,” and
“selective” process. Williams describes how imitation
requires continuous modifying of action plans with the
goal of getting the agent’s actions to match the actions of
the model. Hurley is certainly committed to the claim
that the tendency to imitate is automatic, and that the per-
formance of imitative behaviour must be inhibited.
However, this seems to be distinct from the claim that
the performance of imitative behaviour is automatic.
This is precisely not the case. Normally, we copy beha-
viour covertly, not overtly. It is this covert copying which
Hurley claims forms the basis for the simulation routines
we use to understand the instrumental actions of others.
Mature adult humans can sometimes fail to keep imitation
covert when they have suffered damage to their prefrontal
cortex or when their caudate nucleus is overactive (Kins-
bourne 2005, p. 165). Kinsbourne notes:
Echopraxics do not walk through the world twitching in
response to every movement around them. They do not
imitate the rustling of the leaves and they do not imitate cars
screeching to a halt. One elicits echopraxia by being a
doctor, facing a patient, looking somber and purposeful, and
giving the patient tasks. (Kinsbourne 2005, p. 166)
So, even in this case, imitation is not wholly uninhibited.
Williams makes an interesting suggestion about echo-
praxia. As already explained, he rightly stresses the role
of social interaction in imitative learning. He suggests
that echopraxia may be understood as the result of an
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“impaired capacity for social judgement and flexible rule
learning.” Both capacities are required for imitative learn-
ing according to Williams. Thus, when either of these
capacities is damaged, the result is that subjects can no
longer imitate. We think that the executive areas of the
brain responsible for inhibiting imitative behaviour are
also very likely involved in regulating behaviour in accord-
ance with social norms and in flexible rule learning. Thus,
we wonder whether the difference between Hurley and
Williams on this point might not be so great.
Whiten and Heyes both put pressure on the con-
ception of imitation Hurley assumes in her target article.
Whiten objects to Hurley’s account of the phylogeny of
imitation where emulation comes first and imitation only
rarely follows. He rejects what he describes as the “dichot-
omy of imitation or emulation,” arguing that emulation
comes in a variety of different forms, some of which
overlap with imitation. In his ingenious and important
“ghost experiments,” chimpanzees witness only the
environmental effects of the complex use of a tool. If the
chimpanzees were able to learn through emulation, it
ought to be sufficient for them to just observe the goal-
directed action. However, Whiten found that chimpanzees
could learn the complex use of a tool only by perceiving
another chimpanzee (not a “ghost”) use the tool. The sug-
gestion seems to be that, at least for complex techniques,
chimpanzees cannot figure out their own means to achiev-
ing an end. To learn a complex technique, they must copy
both ends and means.
Before we explore some ways in which Hurley might
have thought about the relation between emulation and
imitation, we should briefly note that she was certainly
no sceptic about imitative behaviour in animals. She was
keen to stress just how complex imitative behaviour is,
requiring as it does that an animal execute movements
from its behavioural repertoire in a new way to achieve
some desired result. This requires what she describes as
the “flexible interplay of copying ends and copying
means; a given movement can be used for different ends
and a given end pursued by various means” (sect. 2.1,
para. 5). Hurley doesn’t deny that some animals are
capable of this kind of complex behaviour. She notes, for
instance, that in the artificial fruits experiments chimpan-
zees will imitate selectively only when the method for
opening the fruit is the most efficient. Elsewhere
(Hurley & Chater 2005b), she discusses and seems to
endorse Byrne and Russon’s (1998) finding of program-
level imitation in gorillas and orangutans. Program-level
imitation occurs when animals learn to copy a specific
sequence of behaviours for the performance of a task,
such as the preparation of a particular type of plant for
eating. Thus, although Hurley certainly insists on a distinc-
tion between imitation and emulation, and insists that imi-
tation is phylogenetically rare, she was no sceptic about
nonhuman imitation.
Hurley did, however, insist that the capacity for social
learning varied across species. She identifies two factors
that contribute to this variation (sect. 3.3, para. 9):
(1) The grain and complexity of instrumental control
capacities
(2) Considerations concerning which of the many
control capacities have associated mirroring functions
and how richly and flexibly these mirroring circuits can
be linked
Some animals will be capable of performing instrumental
actions that are more complex than others, where com-
plexity of behaviour is a function of “means/ends chains
of differing grains and lengths” (sect. 3.3, para. 11). An
animal that combines multiple behaviours in ways that
are appropriate to achieving a given end will be capable
of forming predictive models that are much richer in struc-
ture than will an animal that can perform only simple
behaviours to achieve its ends. Mirroring takes the instru-
mental associations between means (a motor program) and
ends (the consequences of performing an action) that
provide the information for predictive simulations and
uses these associations to mirror the cause of another’s
movement. Animals that employ predictive models that
are rich in structure will be capable of mirroring instru-
mental actions that are equally rich in structure. The
potential for social learning in such an animal will be
much greater than that in animals that are only capable
of simple behaviours and predicting the consequences of
those simple behaviours. Hence, Hurley concludes that,
“Mirroring and simulation might provide information
about the goals of certain observed movements, given
fine-grained, complex means/end associations but not
given coarser control capacities” (sect. 3.3, para. 13).
Animals whose behaviour has a rich means/end structure
will be capable of complex forms of mirroring, and it is this
mirroring that forms the basis for social learning. Animals
whose behaviour lacks this structure will be capable only
of movement priming or perhaps of goal emulation.
Heyes questions what she describes as Hurley’s con-
junctive conception of imitation. According to the conjunc-
tive conception, imitation requires both (1) observational
learning, as when an agent learns an instrumental relation-
ship between a bodily movement and its effect, and (2)
a capacity for copying, where this involves the ability to
perform the observed body movement. Heyes suggests
that observational learning should be distinguished from
copying. It is not clear to us whether she thinks copying
is sufficient for imitation. We would question such a
claim. Copying seems to be a type of behaviour that
could be manifested by creatures that are only capable
of what Hurley calls stimulus enhancement: The action
of another animal draws the observing animal’s attention
to a stimulus, and the stimulus then triggers an innate or
previously learned response. Copying also seems to
occur in cases of movement priming, when observing
a bodily movement primes an animal to perform a
similar movement, but not as a means to an end. It
seems to us that copying has to go together with observa-
tional learning if the animal is to be correctly described as
having learned through imitation – that is to say, by per-
forming some sequence of movements from its beha-
vioural repertoire in a new way so as to achieve a
desired result. We would not describe an animal as
having learned through imitation if the animal doesn’t
understand the instrumental relationship between per-
forming some bodily movements and achieving its ends
or goals.
Longo&Bertenthal describe experiments that seem to
challenge the connection SCM describes between mirror-
ing and imitation. They argue that in some contexts the
motor system will just copy movements and in other con-
texts themotor systemwill copy goals. They describe a para-
digm in which subjects are shown a computer-generated
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hand performing movements, some of which are possible
and others of which are impossible. They found that sub-
jects attempt to copy both the possible and impossible
movements unless their attention is explicitly drawn to
the manner in which the movements are being performed.
It is not clear to us what the instrumental action is in this
experiment. What are the means and ends? What is the
computer-generated hand moving its hand to do? Given
that it is unclear what the goal of the movement is in this
case, it is hard to assess whether subjects were just
copying the movements in the first set-up and the goals in
the second (once their attention was drawn to the manner
in which the movement was performed). We think it
would be interesting to run the same experiment again,
but this time to have the computer-generated hand expli-
citly perform movements with the end of achieving some
goal. In one case, the end could be performed by means
of biomechanical movements that are impossible for the
human hand, and, in the second case, by movements the
human hand could perform.
R4. Beyond shared circuits
Apart from the large raft of questions concerning the
details of the inter-layer transitions, relations, and inter-
actions, a number of commentators raised questions of
scope. How much can the shared circuits model, with its
strong commitment to a single kind of model and mechan-
ism (a control-theoretic account of simulation and mirror-
ing, pursued through a cascade of stepwise refinements)
really explain? As the advertising would have it, the
model aims to reach and illuminate “imitation, delibera-
tion, and mindreading.” But does it really have the
resources to do so? More accurately, just how much of
our understanding of the minds, goals, and intentions of
other agents can be explained using the kinds of resources
Hurley so ably displays?
In much this vein, Carpendale & Lewis worry that the
model “fails to reach action understanding because it relies
on mirroring as a driving force.” Their key charge is that
mechanisms of mirroring are simply too unintelligent to
yield much in the way of action understanding. I may
see you point at something, and that may automatically
activate a pointing tendency in me (even if it is inhibited),
but what does that tell me about why you are pointing?
What is missing, they suggest, is “experience in shared rou-
tines.” Carpendale & Lewis are right, we think, to identify
these kinds of limits in the direct application of the model.
For mirroring circuits do, indeed, only deliver information
about others’ goals and intentions for classes of actions
whose purpose is already appreciated: the act of using a
tool to get food, for example. Even to intelligently
combine the meanings of already-understood actions (to
understand, for example, someone’s pointing to a tool
that is being used to get food) would be a cognitive task
whose successful undertaking plausibly requires more
than the kinds of circuitry discussed in the target article
alone.
This kind of worry is also prominent in the commentary
by Preston, who, while agreeing that many basic percep-
tion-action mechanisms are preserved in our higher-level
understandings, notes that such mechanisms require the
agent to already command an understanding of (or at
least, some form of representation of) the type of action
or state at issue. Closely related issues are raised by van
Rooij, Haselager, & Bekkering [van Rooij et al.],
who note that direct simulation (used to mirror the
means-end structure of observed actions) is often
inadequate to reveal the goal of (or the intentions
behind) an action. This is because our actual understand-
ing of the operative goals and intentions is often pro-
foundly affected by the context in which the action
occurs. As a result, there is no one-to-one relation
between actions (conceived as sets of motor signals) and
goals.Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, in their incisive dis-
cussion of some possible shortcomings of the SCM, point
out that in many cases one needs to understand that the
intention of the other is that you should do something
different to (but complementary to) their own action.
For example, two people can carry a heavy log, but not
by copying each other’s actions, which will be log-end-
specific. Here, the automatic activity of the mirroring
system seems more of a liability than an asset (but see
our remarks later on the commentary by Hove, for one
possible solution, consistent with the spirit of the SCM).
Yet another way of raising the same kind of issue is use-
fully displayed by Paglieri & Castelfranchi, who suggest
that SCM is hamstrung by its failure to consider some
additional roles of goal-states, namely, their role in (not
just control but also) “evaluation and motivation”: that is,
in deciding upon appropriate goals for our own and
others’ actions, and in evaluating the actions in terms of
those newly arrived-at goals. These elements are clearly
central both to the understanding and the generation of
intentional action. But they do not seem to be naturally
captured, at least in any of the more advanced flavours
we have just been discussing, by the bedrock story about
mirroring and shared information spaces for perception
and action.
All this, we feel, is exactly as it should be. It was not
Hurley’s aim to offer a single kind of mechanism as a cog-
nitive panacea, capable (all on its own) of explaining all
aspects of human intelligent performance. Rather, the
story is better seen as an attempt to display one key ingre-
dient in such stories – one that has the virtue of first
appearing (in basic form) at quite low levels of cognitive
sophistication, and then making a contribution at many
later stages. But intelligent human performance is not to
be understood as flowing solely from the operation
of that key ingredient alone. Rather, the ingredient is
one enabling element in a larger story, whose full shape
has yet to be determined.
Several commentators made helpful suggestions con-
cerning such additional mechanisms. The basic story,
Whiten suggests, might well need to be combined with
an account that displays a developing capacity for “second-
ary representation” (Perner 1991), allowing us to maintain
multiple perspectives simultaneously on a single physical
event. Iacoboni reports the exciting discovery, in human
frontal cortex, of what Iacoboni and Dapretto (2006) dub
“super mirror neurons” that seem to modulate the activity
of standard mirror neurons in various ways. Such modula-
tory effects look to offer one possible mechanism by means
of which an increasingly intelligent use of the mirror
system itself may be enabled. Longo & Bertenthal,
while also noting the general limitation that mirroring
requires the presence of the target action in one’s own
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repertoire, report work (Longo et al., in press) that puts
this fact to use as a way of demonstrating the existence
of mirroring at many levels of grain or abstraction.
Longo & Bertenthal also report developmental studies
showing the “progression of inhibitory control over mirror-
ing responses.” Therefore, although there is clearly an
important issue to be resolved concerning the increasingly
intelligent use of shared circuits, there seems no reason to
doubt their role as a functional element in a wide variety of
sophisticated forms of reason and understanding. We
agree with Goldman, however, that it is not clear that
control theory alone will provide a sufficient framework
within which to accommodate and understand the full
gamut of mechanisms active in our understanding of self
and of others.
One specific area where many commentators felt that
the SCM fell short was in accounting for various forms
of joint action and joint attention. Thus, Hove notes that
interpersonal synchrony raises issues that do not arise in
most cases of imitation and mirroring. To synchronize
our actions with those of another (as in the log-carrying
case suggested by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen), we
may need to predict what the other will do and to act
accordingly.
Semin & Cacioppo go further, arguing that despite
presenting itself as a model of social cognition, SCM as
it stands is an individualistic model that fails to account
for the co-regulation of action or the distributed nature
of real social cognition. Thus, imitative behaviour, for
example, is not just about the reproduction of behaviour
but additionally helps establish connections between indi-
viduals that support the co-regulation of action. The point
about establishing connections is expanded by Nielsen,
who notes that some forms of imitation and interpersonal
synchrony may be best understood as what Freeman
(2000) calls “technologies of social bonding.” The point
about co-regulation, if we understand it correctly, is that
the resources that guide and explain the behaviours of
the collective (which may be as small as two) are them-
selves distributed across the agents and (perhaps)
aspects of the situation. Examples of co-regulated beha-
viours include cases of mutual entrainment, such as rhyth-
mic clapping, and cases of complementary action of the
kind previously described (where a complex common
task requires different but matching actions by multiple
agents).
Despite laying out this missing territory in compelling
detail, Semin & Cacioppo remain silent on just how
such phenomena may best be accommodated. A promis-
ing suggestion is made by Hove, who notes that one key
may be the use of the kinds of predictive simulation
stressed by the SCM, but with some of the predictions tar-
geting the actions of others and the joint effects of the
actions of self and other. A concrete example of how
shared circuits may contribute to one specific form of
joint action is given in the thoughtful contribution by
Garrod & Pickering, who focus on the potential role of
such circuits in dialogue. Here, there is emerging evidence
that agents use their own production systems to generate
predictions about the other person’s speech output, in a
way that aids their own comprehension. This is a neat
example of one way in which the kinds of action/percep-
tion found in layer 3 of the SCM may contribute to what
are intuitively much “higher” cognitive capacities.
Several commentators note a prima facie challenge to
Hurley’s heavy use of control theory as a framework for
SCM. Thus, Goldman notes that although there is
strong evidence for the role of efferent copy and reafferent
input in the domain of perception and action, no such
body of evidence exists for many of the other domains
(such as that of pain, feelings, and emotions – for the
latter case, see also the contribution by Preston and our
own comments in section R2) where various shared cir-
cuits also seem to enable mirroring and simulation to
occur. This calls into question, Goldman suggests, the
guiding idea that a control-theoretic perspective is apt as
a general framework for all “shared circuit”-style phenom-
ena. In its place, he proposes a Hebbian learning paradigm
in which associative learning binds together various forms
of neural activation. Oberman & Ramachandran reject
the Hebbian alternative as a sufficient account of the
development of F5 mirror neurons themselves, on the
grounds that one still needs to explain why some F5
neurons end up having mirror properties while others do
not. Goldman might (indeed, probably would) accept the
existence of what Oberman & Ramachandran call “special-
ized mechanisms and hardwired constraints” for this
special population, while still rejecting (but again, see
our comments in section R2) any generalization of the
control-theoretic explanatory apparatus to other domains
in which mirroring and mindreading also seem to occur.
At least one of us (Clark) is inclined to the view that the
choice of a single control-theoretic perspective to
address all such phenomena would indeed be premature.
It seems unlikely that all the work required can be
achieved by any single kind of mechanism. Nonetheless,
the attempt to display a wide variety of mirror-system
phenomena from a control-theoretic perspective strikes
us as eminently worthwhile. Subsequent departures from
that perspective, and the exploration of additional kinds
of mechanism and explanatory framework, can then be
motivated and described on a case-by-case basis.
We would like to end by flagging, once again, what we
take to be the central contribution of the SCM, which is
the suggestion that social cognition is continuous with
more basic cases in which we perceive the actions of
others by means that involve (and not merely as collateral
effects or learnt associations) one’s own capacities for
similar actions. In this way, Hurley posits a “shared infor-
mation space” as a starting point for our explorations
of interpersonal space and as a lever for our coordinated
action. The problem facing the intelligent agent is then,
not so much how to learn about the minds of others, as
how to separate her own mind from the minds of others.
Insofar as this is correct, it turns much of the standard dis-
cussion inside out. “Mindreading” becomes the norm,
though at the cost (Star Trek fans will recognize) of a
Borg-like threat of mutual cognitive dissolution. By moni-
tored inhibition of output, we nonetheless end up extrud-
ing a genuine (but perhaps fragile?) self/other distinction
in the face of (and without ever disabling) those basic ten-
dencies of automatic copying and simulation. Such a story,
if it is true, matters in ways that go far beyond the immedi-
ate concerns of the cognitive scientific community. It
matters for policy, for education, for psychiatry, and for
our own self-understanding as a species. Hurley herself
was keenly aware of this larger picture, and we would rec-
ommend that interested readers consult her powerful
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paper, Hurley (2006a), revealingly entitled “Bypassing
Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imita-
tion, and Freedom of Speech.”
Much, to be sure, remains unresolved. Hurley’s story, at
least in its broadest outlines, is compatible (as many com-
mentators rightly observed) with a wide variety of ways of
“filling in the mechanisms” and of linking (or even identi-
fying) the putative layers. But whatever the details, there
seems something deeply right about the guiding spirit.
That spirit is a vision of the human mind as fundamentally
social, as an evolved organ not of solipsistic individual cog-
nizing, but of social and communal co-cognizing. That kind
of talk is not unfamiliar (especially to those working in
developmental science), but it has not yet informed the
shape of the cognitive scientific mainstream. Hurley’s
great achievement is to place this kind of model center
stage, and to do so in a way that – as we have seen – is
both concrete enough to raise questions of detail, scope,
and adequacy, yet general enough to invite constructive
elaboration for many years to come.
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